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NOTES
McConathy v. McConathy: A Diploma, a Divorce, and a
Dilemma

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September of 1983, Mr. McConathy married Ms. Prestridge.' Later that
fall, Mr. McConathy returned to Louisiana Tech University to complete a degree
in elementary education that he had begun in 1976.2 In November of 1988, Mr.
McConathy received his degree. A judgment of divorce was granted in favor of
Ms. Prestridge on February 8, 1990.' Ms. Prestridge requested an award, based
on Louisiana Civil Code article 121, for her financial contributions to Mr.
McConathy's education.4 The trial court awarded Ms. Prestridge $11,877. 5
The appellate court reduced her award to $5,605 based on her financial
contributions to her husband's direct educational costs and to his one-half of their
joint living expenses.6
II.

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE

121

Louisiana has codified a remedy for the contributions made by one spouse
to the other spouse's education.? Louisiana Civil Code article 121 states:

Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
I. McConathy v. McConathy, 632 So. 2d 1200 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1052
(1994).
2. Mr. McConathy enrolled in Louisiana Tech University in the fall of 1976 and left in 1980
without obtaining a degree.
3. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202.
4. Id. The broad language of La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991) indicates that the claim for contributions
to the spouse's education may be part of the proceedings for judicial partition ofthe community. See
Katherine S. Spaht, Developments in the Law 1985-1986--Persons and Matrimonial Regimes, 47 La.
L. Rev. 391, 406 (1986). The introduction to La. R.S. 9:2801 (1991) states:
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the
settlement ofthe claims between the spouses arising from the matrimonial regime, either
spouse, upon termination of the matrimonial regime, or as an incident of the action which
would result in atermination of the matrimonial regime, may institute a proceeding ....
(emphasis added). Article 121 provides that the claim may be brought "[in aproceeding for divorce
or thereafter ...." The claim for contributions need not be combined with any other proceeding as
it may be "awarded ...in addition to asum for support and to property received in the partition of
community property." La. Civ. Code art. 121.
5. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1203. The trial court rendered its judgment on October 7,1991.
On December 11, 1991, the trial court issued an amended judgment due to "clerical and arithmetic
errors" in the original opinion. Id. at 1202.
6. Id. at 1205. The court based its award on the formula articulated in a Minnesota case,
DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
7. For purposes of pronoun reference in this article, it is assumed the student spouse is the
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In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may award a party
a sum for his financial contributions made during the marriage to
education or training of his spouse that increased the spouse's earning
power, to the extent that the claimant did not benefit during the
marriage from the increased earning power.
The sum awarded may be in addition to a sum for support and to
property received in the partition of community property.8
Courts in states without similar legislation must first determine whether the
degree is properly classified as property. Then, the court must decide if or how
the supporting spouse should be compensated based on whether the degree is
classified as marital property. 9 Article 121, by contrast, assumes that the degree
is not property' o and that an award may be granted to the supporting spouse.
Article 121 is virtually identical to its predecessor, Article 161 (enacted in
1986), but provides the following principal change: Article 161 required that
financial contributions be made to the student spouse's education, training, or
increased earning power." Article 121, however, requires that the financial
contributions made by the supporting spouse actually increase the student
spouse's earning power. There must be a causal connection between the
education to which the supporting spouse financially contributed and the student
spouse's increased earning power.' 2

husband and the supporting spouse isthe wife, although the reverse situation is not unlikely to occur.
8. Article 121 was originally enacted as Article 117 by Acts 1990, No. 1008, § 2 from House
Bill No. 1102 introduced on recommendation by the Louisiana State Law Institute. Article 117 was
redesignated as Article 121 pursuant to Acts 1990, No. 1008, § 8. and Acts 1990, No. 1009, § 10.
Article 121 was amended by Acts 199l, No. 367, § 6, to remove the reference to actions based on
separation from bed and board.
9. Courts have treated the claim in four principal ways:
1)The degree or license is marital property subject to division.
2) The degree or license is not marital property, but the court may award reimbursement
alimony to cover the supporting spouse's financial contributions to the student spouse's
education.
3) The degree or license is not marital property, but the court may award rehabilitative
alimony to the supporting spouse, who postponed her own education, to assist her spouse
in completing her education.
4) The degree or license is not marital property, but it is a factor to consider in awarding
traditional alimony, maintenance, and other property distribution.
See Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search Of Equity In "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse"

Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 751, 799 (1988); Theodore P.Orenstein & Gary N. Skoloff, When A
Professional Divorces: Strategies for Valuing Practices, Licences, and Degrees (1994).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 121 cml. f.
11. Article 121 contains inother slight modification of Article 161. Article 161 excluded recovery
to the extent that the other party previously benefited from such education, training, or increased
earning power. Article 121, however, reduces recovery only to the extent that the contributing spouse
has benefited from the increased earning power. Thus, if any reduction on recovery is necessary,
Article 121 provides for a lesser reduction.
12. The student spouse may raise a defense to performance of his obligation. The student spouse
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The language of Article 121 suggests the potential parameters of the trial
judge's discretion in granting an award.' 3 The phrase "a sum for" is significant
in defining the scope of the award. The word "sum" suggests an award that may
exceed actual financial contributions made. 4 The use of the indefinite article
"a"also supports the availability of an award not necessarily equal to the amount
of the supporting spouse's financial contributions.
An award exceeding actual financial contributions could be a proportionate
part of the student spouse's increased earning capacity. Although nothing in the
article expressly authorizes such an award, the permissive language indicates the
legislature's intent to give the trial judge the discretion to grant such an award.
The legislative history of Article 121 also supports the flexibility the trial
judge has in granting and in calculating an appropriate award for the supporting
spouse. The original Louisiana State Law Institute bill was introduced with the
phrase, "a sum not to exceed financial contributions." This phrase capped the
award at the sum of the spouse's direct and indirect financial contributions. On
the Senate floor, however, the bill was amended to read, "a sum for financial
contributions."" The amendment codified the legislature's intent to remove the
ceiling on the award. This removal of the ceiling on the award demonstrates a
preference for allowing a judge to use his discretion to award a proportionate
part of increased earning power. Because comments to a proposed article are not
amended once the bill is introduced, the comments to Article 121 were not

may claim that the financial contributions did not increase his earning capacity. Even if the student
spouse did not pursue a career with the new degree, the supporting spouse's financial contributions

increased the student spouse's earning capacity, The student spouse's actual earning power was not
increased'only because the student spouse chose not to take advantage of his new degree.
If the student spouse is injured and thus unable to use the degree, the student spouse may also raise
the defense of impossibility of performance in seeking a partial or complete release from the
obligation. The obligor, however, must meet the requirements of Article 1873 and prove his inability
to exercise his increased earning capacity is a"fortuitous event" as defined by Article 1875 and prove
none of the exceptions of Article 1873 applies.
13. "This Article restates the basic elements of the cause of action created by the 1986 Act,
including the discretionary character of the remedy." La. Civ. Code art. 121 cmt. b.
14. Spaht, supra note 4,at 397. Clearly, the court may award a lesser amount if the supporting
spouse has already benefited during the marriage from the increased earning power. Presumably, the
court may award less than the amount of financial contributions made even when no benefit was
realized. However, the purpose of the award under Anicle 121 is to compensate the supporting
spouse who was deprived of her expectation of sharing in her husband's enhanced income and who
was left with few compensating community assets. La. Civ. Code an. 121 cmi. c. The purpose of
the article suggests that the court should not award less than the financial contributions made by the
supporting spouse, unless a benefit was realized by the supporting spouse.
The court of appeal will employ the abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the trial
court made the correct decision. A finding of an abuse of discretion is based on the purpose
underlying the award. See, e.g.. Arrendell v. Arrendell. 390 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
If the trial court has unlimited discretion in awarding an amount, the court of appeal can never find
an abuse of discretion. Thus, the purpose of the award should guide the trial court in determining
the appropriate award.
15. 3 La. Senate J. 1675-76 (July 3, 1990).
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amended during the legislative process to reflect the removal of the ceiling on

the award. The legislative history of Article 121, however,6 confirms prior

speculation about the flexibility of the total sum of the award.'
By contrast to the implicit, potential award of a proportionate part of
increased earning capacity, financial contributions are explicitly recoverable
under Article 121. Financial contributions include both the "direct educational
or training expenses" and "the living expenses of the supported spouse. 1 7

Support for the conclusion that a minimum award includes both direct and
indirect financial contributions is found in comment (d) which contains the
definition of financial contributions in two separate sentences. Moreover,
comment (d) cites DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 18 a case in which both direct and

indirect financial contributions were awarded.
Louisiana Civil Code article 123 indicates that the legislature envisioned a
lump sum award but would permit payments in installments for convenience to

the obligor: 9 Distinguishable from permanent periodic alimony," this award
for financial contributions to the spouse's education is not based on need and
does not terminate upon remarriage of the claimant spouse. In addition, fault
does not bar recovery under Article 121.21
III. MCCONATTIY V.MCCONATHY
McConathy contains the first thorough interpretation and application of
Article 121 by the Louisiana courts. The appellate court recognized that the trial
court erroneously based its award to Ms. Prestridge on her lost ability to share

16. Spaht, supra note 4, at 396. Professor Spaht suggested that Article 161 permitted an award
in excess of the financial contributions of the supporting spouse. The language in Article 161, "a
sum for financial contributions," suggested that the sum awarded was not necessarily limited to the
actual financial contributions. The language indicated the possibility of an award that included a
prorated portion of the student spouse's increased earning capacity. The Louisiana legislature's
enactment of Article 121 with amended language to reject the ceiling on the award confirms
Professor Spaht's speculation about the scope of Article 161. See also Kenneth Rigby & Katherine
S. Spaht, Louisiana's New Divorce Legislation: Background and Commentary, 54 La. L. Rev. 19,
22-24 (1993).
17. La. Civ. Code art. 121 cmt. d. "'Financial contributions' include direct educational or training
expenses paid by the claimant for the other spouse-such as tuition, books, and school fees. The
term also includes financial contributions made to satisfy the living expenses of the supported
spouse." Id.
18. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
19. The sum awarded for contributions made to the education or training of a spouse may be a
sum certain payable in installments. La. Civ. Code art. 123.
20. The supporting spouse is likely to be denied alimony as she has demonstrated her earning
capacity as the family supporter. On the other hand, the spouse likely to receive alimony may be
denied an award under Article 121 if she has benefited from the education of the student spouse. See
La. Civ. Code art. 121 cmt. c; La. Civ. Code art. 123 cmt. b.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 121 cmt. c.
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in Mr. McConathy's enhanced income.22 The appellate court properly corrected

the trial court's error by calculating Ms. Prestridge's award based on the amount
of her financial contributions to Mr. McConathy's education. The prerequisite
to recovery under Article 121 is not proof of the lack of opportunity to share in
the student spouse's enhanced income; rather, it is financial contributions made
by the supporting spouse to the student spouse's education. However, the lack

of opportunity to share in the student spouse's enhanced income is a fundamental
assumption underlying this award.23
The McConathy court attempted to correct the third circuit's interpretation
of former Article 161, the predecessor of Article 121, in Krielow v. Krielow. 4
In Krielow, the court refused to include indirect living expenses in the award to
the supporting spouse. The McConathycourt, however, quoted the two sentences
of comment (d), thus acknowledging the article's coverage of both direct and
indirect financial contributions. Moreover, theMcConathycourt included in Ms.
Prestridge's award the financial contributions she made to the family's living

expenses---expenses considered indirect in comment (d).
Applying Article 121, the appellate court calculated Ms. Prestridge's award
of direct and indirect financial contributions based on her financial contributions
to Mr. McConathy's education. In amending the trial court award from one
based on Mr. McConathy's increased earning power to one based on Ms.

Prestridge's financial contributions, 2 1 the appellate court implied the trial court
had abused its discretion.

22. The appellate court cited the standard used by the trial court "[iln calculating Ms. Prestridge's
lack ofopportunity to share in Mr. McConathy's enhanced income." McConathy v. McConathy, 632
So. 2d 1200, 1203 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1052 (1994). The court later stated,
"[b]ecause the assets of the community were insufficient to compensate Ms. Prestridge for her
inability to share tn the enhanced income, the [trial] court made a separate award to her." Id.
(emphasis added).
23. Usually the wife-has had little opportunity to share in the husband's enhanced income,
and ordinarily little or no community property has accumulated to be divided between
them. Thus, the only way to compensate her is by means of a monetary award akin to
support, but different from support in that it is not affected by the various factors that
govern such an award.
La. Civ. Code art. 121 cmt. c. The award is reduced to the extent the supporting spouse has already
benefited from the student spouse's increased earning power.
24. 622 So.2d 732 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 635 So. 2d 180 (La. 1994).
In Krielow, the only case interpreting and analyzing Article 161. the court awarded the husband one
half of his direct financial contributions to his wife's education. The award included direct expenses
for tuition and books but did not include the husband's indirect expenses for child care and
transportation. The court reasoned that "theae costs do not constitute direct financial contributions
to educational expenses as intended by the legislature." Krielow, 622 So. 2d at 741. The Krielow
court only cited the first sentence of the comment and limited recovery to direct financial
contributions. Id. at 740.
25. Mr. McConathy also alleged the trial court erred in considering his present salary as evidence
of his enhanced income or earning capacity. Because the court based the award solely on Ms.
Prestridge's direct and indirect financial contributions, the court properly did not address this alleged
error.
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' The trial court labeled its award as the "value of lost benefit."26 The trial
court calculated the value of lost benefit as simply the difference between the
amount Mr. McConathy earned during his first year teaching and the highest
amount he earned during the marriage. An award based on a one-year salary
increase is not an adequate measure of the value of lost benefit.
The appellate court implied there are two additional prerequisites to recovery
under Article 121, neither of which is supported by the text of the article. First,
the appellate court recognized that Ms. Prestridge "met the requirements of
[Article] 12127 by stating, "[sipecifically, the [trial] court found that Ms.
Prestridge earned substantially more than Mr. McConathy during the marriage." 28 Thus, the appellate court implied a requirement that the supporting
spouse earn substantially more than the student spouse during the marriage. The
text of Article 121, however, requires only that some financial contribution to the
student spouse's education or training be made during the marriage and makes
no reference to the amount of the supporting spouse's earnings.29
Second, the court stated, "[b]ecause the assets of the community were
insufficient to compensate Ms. Prestridge.... the [trial] court made aseparate
award .

. . ."

The court implicitly agreed with the trial court by assuming the

total income of the spouses was consumed by the educational and living
expenses. The court thereby suggested that an insufficiency of community assets
is a prerequisite to recovery. Article 121, however, contains no requirement of
insufficient community assets.0
The insufficiency of community assets in McConathy, however, is relevant.
Under Article 121, the sum for financial contributions is subject to reduction to
the extent that the supporting spouse has previously benefited from the student
spouse's increased earning power.31 The court's reference to the insufficiency
of community assets may suggest the supporting spouse had not yet benefited.
If the insufficiency of community assets indicated Ms. Prestridge's failure to
benefit from Mr. McConathy's increased earning power, the court was correct
in not reducing the award. The court's opinion, however, could be misinterpreted to mean that insufficient community assets are a prerequisite to recovery.
A. The DeLaRosa Formula

The appellate court, in calculating Ms. Prestridge's award, applied the
formula from DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa32 as suggested in comment (d) to Article

26.
27.
28.
29.

McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1203.
Id.
Id.
Article 121 does not require that a degree be granted during the marriage.

30. Generally, the couple has few assets of value because all resources are expended on their
educational and living expenses. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1205 (citing Spahi, supra note 4.at 394).
31. La. Civ. Code art. 121.
32. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). The formula provides:

NOTES
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121. The DeLaRosa formula provides a method for calculating "the figure that
represents the supporting spouse's financial contributions."33 The formula limits
the award to the supporting spouse's financial contributions to the direct
educational costs and the living expenses of the student spouse.' First, any
financial contributions made by the student spouse apply to the direct costs of
the student spouse's education. The supporting spouse's financial contributions
cover any difference between the the student spouse's financial contributions and
the cost of the education. Then, the formula assumes the measure of the
couple's living expenses is the remainder of the supporting spouse's financial
contributions. The formula imputes one half of the couple's living expenses (the
combined total of the student and supporting spouses' financial contributions less
the cost of the education) to the student spouse and the other one half to the
supporting spouse's own living expenses.
The McConathy court improperly applied the DeLaRosa formula because
DeLaRosa, which arose in a non-community property jurisdiction, did not
consider the community obligation aspect of the student loan. The McConathy
court classified the student loan as a community obligation. 35 However, in
calculating the equitable award to Ms. Prestridge, the court included the entire
loan as Mr. McConathy's financial contributions. The attribution of the entire
loan to Mr. McConathy's financial contributions increased his total financial
contributions and, consequently, reduced Ms. Prestridge's award. Had the court
attiibuted to each spouse a share of the community obligation, as determined in
the community partition, then the award to Ms. Prestridge would have been
greater.'

(W]orking spouse's financial contributions ... [including joint living expenses and
educational costs of student spouse)
less
1/2 (working spouse's financial contributions pl.is student spouse's financial contributions
less cost of education)
equals
equitable award to working spouse
The student spouse's financial contributions include any earnings and any student loans, grants,
stipends, or other funds obtained. Id. at 759.

33. La. Civ. Code art. 121 cmt. d.
34. DelaRosa. 309 N.W.2d at 759.
35. Article 2360 defines a community obligation as one "incurred by a spouse during the
existence of'a community property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest
of the other spouse."

Article 2361 presumes that an obligation incurred by a spouse during the

existence of the community is a community obligation unless it is a separate obligation as provided
in Article 2363. The student loan was obtained for the common interests of the spouses. Mr.
McConathy secured the loan during the existence of the community property regime. At that time,
the McConathys contemplated Mr. McConathy's schooling would ultimately benefit the community.
by increasing his earning capacity. McConathy v. McConathy. 632 So. 2d 1200, 1207 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1052 (1994). Thus, the court classified the student loan as a
community obligation. See generally Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes
* 7.12, at 271-76, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
36. The community obligation was divided equally between the spouses; therefore, the loan can
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Any future court should consider adjusting the DeLaRosa formula for
application in Louisiana, a community property state. A persuasive argument
may be made that if the student loan is treated as community property, then the
earnings of the spouses should also be recognized as community property. Such
a modification in the formula may reflect each spouse's one-half interest in the
other spouse's earnings."
B. Contributions Made by Others
The court declined to include in Ms. Prestridge's award the child support
payments she received from a previous marriage and the house trailer payments
made as a gift to the couple by Mr. McConathy's mother. The court's refusal
to include these sums was consistent with the language of Article 121, which
provides for recovery of the supporting spouse's own financial contributions.
Although the trailer payments and child support payments were technically the
property of both the McConathys and only Ms. Prestridge respectively, 8 this
money was ultimately the property of the third party creditor of the trailer note

be excluded from the equation. Applying the DeLaRosa formula without inclusion of the student
loan results in an award of $8855.00 as follows:
$16,378 (wife's financial contributions) - 1/2 [$16.378 (wife's financial contributions) +
$1727 (husband's earnings) - $3059 (husband's direct educational costs)] = $8855.00.
The formula assumes that all of the spouses' earnings are spent on the educational and living
expenses and that the student's contributions include any student loans, grants, stipends, or other
funds obtained by the student spouse. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1205 (citing Spaht, supra note 4,
at 394); DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d at 759.
37. For a calculation of the award taking into account community property principles, see section
IV, infra. Arguably, community properly should not be considered in calculating the award to the
supporting spouse. The earnings of the spouses probably do not exceed the Article 98 mutual
obligation of support, since it is assumed all of their earnings are expended on the educatiobal and
living expenses. Thus, if the Article 98 obligation is disregarded, the reference to community
property should similarly be disregarded. Moreover, Article 121 states the award may be apart from
and in addition to the partition of community property.
38. The trailer payments were either paid to the couple subject to the explicit or implicit condition
that the money be used to make payments on the trailer note or were paid directly to the third party
creditor. The child support payments, although considered by the jurisprudence to be property of Ms.
Prestridge, were for the benefit of her children from a previous marriage. Child support payments
are the property of the custodial parent. Simon v. Calvert. 289 So. 2d 567 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs
refused, 293 So. 2d 187 (1974). A persuasive argument may be made, however, that child support
payments are actually the property of the child, but that payment to the custodial parent satisfies the
obligation of the noncustodial parent. In Dubroc v. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980), the court
emphasized that each parent owes to a child the obligation of upbringing and support. To facilitate
enforcement of this obligation, the law gives the custodial spouse a right of action against the other
spouse to compel the advancement of money necessary to contribute to the child's maintenance. The
purpose underlying the parent's right to receive child support i's to enforce the child's right to receive
support and upbringing. Id. at 379-80. Therefore, it follows that the child support payments should
be considered property of the child as the child is the creditor of the parent's obligation to support
the child. The custodial parent merely receives the payments on behalf of the child to whom the
parental obligation is owed.
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and of the child. Thus, the court was correct in not considering these amounts
as part of Ms. Prestridge's own financial contributions. The trailer payments and
the child support payments were living expenses, indirect financial contributions,
but these financial contributions had a specifically designated purpose other than
the education of the student spouse. 9
IV.

AN AWARD OF THE STUDENT SPOUSE'S INCREASED EARNING CAPACITY

The court should be reluctant to award the extraordinary remedy of a
proportionate part of increased earning capacity. This remedy should be limited
to the most compelling cases. The assumptions underlying an award of financial
contributions, which under Article 121 include both educational and living
expenses, are the supporting spouse's expectation of shared benefit, the degree
of detriment suffered by the supporting spouse, and the magnitude of the benefit
received by the student spouse.4° Once the threshold of financial contributions
is awarded, then the court may consider the supporting spouse's non-financial
contributions in determining whether to award more-possibly a proportionate
part of the student spouse's increased earning power. Non-financial contributions
include foregone opportunities of the supporting spouse,4 moral support, and
relocation. 2 Other factors to consider are the immediacy of divorce, the length

of the education, the type of degree,43 and the choice of institution.
In the most compelling cases, the considerations just described may justify
a redistribution of the wealth by awarding a sum that represents a proportionate
part of the student spouse's increased eaining power. An example is a case of
a student spouse who uses the supporting spouse as a vehicle to finance his
education and who immediately thereafter divorces the supporting spouse.

39. A gift to either spouse without a designated purpose might not be excluded from the
recoverable amount if the recipient chooses to contribute the gift to the education or the training of
the student spouse.
40. Spaht, supra note 4, at 393: Orenstein & Skoloff, supra note 9, at 71.
41. Batts, supra note 9, at 793. Batts also suggests the supporting spouse who has permanently
foregone her own professional goals rather than one who has merely postponed her professional goals
might be more likely to recover a portion of the student spouse's increased earning capacity because
her c6ntributions were greater and because she may depend more heavily on the student spouse. Id.
42. For other non-financial contributions, see Reiss v. Reiss, 500 A.2d 24, 25 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1985). See also Batts, supra note 9, at 792-94 (Non-financial contributions include providing
a comforting, clean, nurturing living space; furnishing and repairing the home; maintaining a social
environment; and coordinating holiday arrangements). Some of these contributions, however,
constitute the mutual obligation of assistance tinder Article 98 and are only relevant if they exceed
this obligation.
43. Article 121 applies to claims for contributions to any type of education or training including
undergraduate, graduate, professional, & vocational degrees. Article 121 also applies to education
or training in which no degree is earned but to which financial contributions were made during the
marriage. Pursuit of a professional degree, however, creates a larger expectation of return for the
supporting spouse whose investment is longer and more costly. Thus, when the supporting spouse
is deprived of the expected community benefits, equity entitles her to a more generous award.
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Absent an admission by the student spouse, such bad faith is extremely difficult
to prove.
Ordinarily, law and equity recognize that after divorce, the student spouse
is free to acquire separate property. Income earned after dissolution of the
community is income earned by the student spouse's own time, work, and effort.
Therefore, a typical claim under Article 121 may not always warrant the
generous award of a proportionate part of increased earning capacity.
Ms. Prestridge, a typical claimant under Article 121, would not be a
candidate for an award of a proportionate part of her husband's increased earning
capacity. Ms. Prestridge certainly expected a return on her investment in her
husband's education. However, Mr. McConathy received his degree in just one
year and eight months which is a relatively short period within which to obtain
a degree."' The family did not relocate to allow Mr. McConathy to attend a
particular institution. He simply continued, at his wife's urging, his undergraduate education which he had begun prior to their marriage. Under these
circumstances, it was appropriate for-the court to limit Ms. Prestridge's award
to her direct and indirect financial contributions.
A. Proposed Method of Calculation
The McConathy court, guided by DeLaRosa, combined the calculations of
direct and indirect living expenses into one formula. A clearer method of
calculation separates the calculations of the direct and indirect financial
contributions and consequently, facilitates computation of an award under the
DeLaRosa formula. As in DeLaRosa, any financial contributions made by the
student spouse apply to direct educational costs. If the student spouse's financial
contributions exceed direct educational costs, the excess applies to the indirect
financial costs of his education. At this point, this method assumes the
supporting spouse has not yet benefited from the student spouse's increased
earning power; therefore, no deduction is required. Moreover, this method
presumes that the supporting spouse is not-entitled to a portion of the.student
spouse's increased earning, power. Finally, this method assumes all of the
spouses' earnings are expended on the educational and living expenses of the
couple.
The following computation, using the figures from McConathy, illustrates
this method. The court should begin with the. direct costs of the education,
$3059, and subtract the husband's total financial contributions, $1727. The
difference, $1332, equals the direct educational costs covered by the wife's
financial contributions-giving her a dollar for dollar credit. Next, the court
should subtract the wife's direct educational contributions, $1332, from her total
financial contributions, $16,378. The difference, $15,046, equals the wife's
financial contributions to the indirect costs of h'er husband's education. This

44. Mr. McConathy had completed four years of his education when he married Ms. Prestridge.
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amount, $15,046, divided by two, imputes one half of the indirect educational
costs (living expenses), or $7523, to the husband while the other one half is
deemed spent on the wife herself. Finally, the court should add the wife's.
financial contributions to the direct educational costs, $1332, to her financial
contributions to the indirect educational costs, $7523. The sum, $8855, equals
the award to the wife. 3 An argument can be made that this formula should
consider community property and, consequently, reduce the supporting spouse's

award.46

B. ProposedValuation of Increased Earning Capacity
Should the court choose to award the extraordinary remedy of a proportionate part of increased earning capacity, the court must determine the value of the
student spouse's education. Most methods equate the value of an education with
the student spouse's future earning capacity. 47 These methods suggest that the

45. Wife's direct educational financial contributions = Direct cost of the education Husband's financial contributions = $3059 - 1727 = $1332.
Wife's indirect educational financial contributions = l/2(wife's total financial
contributions - wife's direct educational financial contributions) = 1/2($16,378 - 1332) =
$7523.
Award to wife = wife's direct educational financial contributions + wife's indirect
educational financial contributions = $1332 + 7523 = $8855.
The student loan is excluded from the calculation because, as a community obligation, each spouse
owes an equal one-half.
46. If the spouses' earnings are community property, each spouse's earnings should be divided
by two and increased by the amount of the student loan attributable to each spouse. The husband's
financial contributions apply first to the direct educational expenses. The difference between the
remainder of the husband's financial contributions, if any, and the wife's financial contributions (less
any direct educational costs not covered by the husband) should be divided by two so as to impute
one-half of the indirect living expenses to each spouse. The quotient is the wife's award. Using this
formula, the wife's award is $5192.25:
Husband's financial contributions = his earnings/2 + his half of the student loan =
$1727/2 + 4886.40 = $5749.90.
Husband's financial contributions - direct educational costs = husband's financial
contributions to indirect educational costs = $5479.90 -.3059 = $2690.90.
Wife's financial contributions = her earnings/2 + her half of the student loan =
$16,378/2 + 4886.40 = $13,075.40.
Wife contributes nothing to the direct educational costs.
Wife's award = 1/2 (wife's financial contributions - husband's financial contributions
to indirect educational costs) = 1/2 ($13,075.40 -2690.90) = $5192.25.
47. For a variety of methods, see Orenstein & Skoloff, supra note 9, at 111-13; Albert A.
Fitzpatrick & Robert E. Doucette, Can The Economic Value Of An Education Really Be Measured?
A Guide For Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. Fain. L. 511 (1982-83); Kenneth R. Davis. The
Doctrine of O'Brien v. O'Brien: A Critical Analysis, 13 Pace L. Rev. 863, 894 (1994); Helen A.
Boyer, Recent Development: Equitable Ilterest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment Of
A ProfessionalDegree At Dissolauion-In re Marriage of Washburn, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 431 (1985);
Eugene T. Maccarrone & Martha S. Weisel, The CPA License at Divorce. The CPA Journal 22
(March 1992).
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court first calculate the difference between the student spouse's expected income
with the degree and the expected income had his education ceased at the date of
the marriage.48 Next, the court should reduce the difference due to the risk of

death according to mortality tables.49 Finally, the court should discount the
amount to present value. Additional modifications in the valuation methods may
include an increase for rising productivity, 50 an increase for inflation, and an
adjustment for taxes.5' The present value figure should be multiplied by the
fraction representing the proportion the supporting spouse's financial contributions bear to the couple's total financial contributions to the student spouse's
education. 2
Because of the speculative nature of the figures, no method of calculation
is flawless. These methods often estimate income based on averages. The
estimations do not account for potential career changes or potential loss of

license.

Moreover, the methods do not consider any further education or

53
experience the student spouse may acquire.
The court should award, at a minimum, the supporting spouse's direct and
indirect financial contributions. The court then has flexibility to increase the
award depending on the significance and the magnitude of the supporting

spouse's non-financial contributions.
McConathy illustrates one step toward an increased award to the supporting
spouse-using both direct and indirect financial contributions. The court has yet
to be presented with a situation that warrants an award of a proportionate part
of the student spouse's increased earning capacity. However, the possibility for
such an award does exist. Students who are financially supported by their

48. These figures may be obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census.
Social and Economic Statistics Administration.
49. If either spouse dies before ajudgment is rendered under Article 12 1, the personal obligation
is extinguished. See La. Civ. Code. an. 122. If the obligor spouse dies after the judgment of the
award, nothing in the law changes the amount of the award. The judgment is enforceable against the
deceased obligor's heirs. For this reason, the trial judge should use caution in granting an award of
aportion of the student spouse's increased earning capacity. If granted, the court should reduce the
award based on the risk of mortality.
50. Fitzpatrick & Doucette. supra note 47, at 517.
51. Maccarrone & Weisel. supra note 47. at 27.
52. Similar calculations are made in community property pension cases. See, e.g., Sims v. Sims,
358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1975). on reh'g,
332 So. 2d 849 (La. 1976).
53. Orenstein & Skoloff, supra note 9, at 113. In community property pension cases, see supra
note'52, after Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 1991), the court may. upon proper showing by
the employee spouse, modify the fraction representing the community interest as originally calculated
to reflect post-divorce increases in the employee spouse's pension benefits. See Katherine S. Spaht,
To Divide or Not to Divide the Community Interest in an Uninatured Pension: Present Cash Value
Versus Fixed Percentage, 53 La. L. Rev. 753. 761 (1993); Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, 52
La. L. Rev. 655, 664-68 (1992). The parallel situation may develop in Article 121 awards. A future
court may reserve jurisdiction to modify the formula representing the supporting spouse's interest in
the student spouse's increased earning capacity based on future changes in the student spouse's
income.
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spouses should be aware of the court's ability to grant this most generous award
to the supporting spouse. Even if such an award is inappropriate, after
McConathy, the student spouse should at least note the likelihood of a court
awarding the supporting spouse his or her direct and indirect financial contributions.
Caroline B. Blitzer

